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Realizing the Potential of
Arbitration in Federal
Agency Dispute Resolution
By Marsha// J. Breger

p..

ol the Administrative Dispute Kesoiulion Act oi 1990' established a federal policy favoring public
sector use of mediation, minitrials,
structural settlement procedures and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The intent of the act is
to provide federal agencies with an
"inexpensive means of resolving disputes as an alternative to litigation in
the Federal courts/'- In this article, I
will discuss the act's explicit approval
of the use of arbitration by administrative agencies as a means ol dispute
resolution.
Tiirough fhe Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925/" Congress placed its imprimatur on private sector arbitration.
However, arbitral techniques v^'ere not
accepted for use in the federal sector.
Since early in the century, the comptroller general has repeatedly stated
that a federal agency is prohibited
from using a private arbitrator in monetary claims involving the liability of
the government unless it has explicit
statutory authority to dt) so.'* While
this view of the law has not been universally accepted, there is no doubt
that the comptroller's skepticism has
chilled agency efforts to use arbitration.'^
There have, of course, been occasional explicit statutory provisions
with authorized arbitration. These
statutes include provi.sions requiring
Marshall /. Brewer is the chair of the Admiihs(raiivc Confernicf vf the United Stales. He
was appaiiitcd lo tin- position by President
Roiuilii

Rni^dJi

ill

1985.

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 has given direct
authorization to all federal government agencies to voluntarily agree
to use alternative dispute resolution (specifically arbitration) in any
type of dispute—whether disputes between the government and private parties, interagency matters or labor-management disputes within
one agency. This law will be overseen by the Administrative Conference, which coordinates and advises agencies on the act's implementation. The Administrative Conference is a permanent federal agency
established in 1964. Its purpose is to "improve the procedures of federal agencies so that they may fairly and expeditiously carry out their
responsibilities."

arbitration under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)** to determine the compensation a pesticide manufacturer must
pay for the use of another's data in
obtaining federal registration; permitting arbitration between private parties in some cases regarding Superfund cleanup of toxic waste^ and
permitting arbitration to determine an
employer's liability for withdrawal
from pension plans that are overseen
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.^ At the same time, binding arbitration has been an enduring feature
of collective bargaining agreements
within the federal government under
Executive Order 11,491'' and the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.'"
Uncertainty as to agency authority to use arbitration ended last year
with the passage of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA). The
act moots the comptroller general's
kingstanding position on general

agency use of arbitration." The act requires agencies, in consultation with
the Administrative Conference of the
United States and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to review systematically all "administrative
programs" for ADR potential and
adopt policies addressing the use of
ADR in typical agency disputes.'- Additionally, an agency must designate a
senior official as its dispute resolution
specialist, provide ADR training for
selected personnel and review grants
and contracts for possible inclusion of
clauses encouraging ADR use.'^
The act amends the Administrative Procedure Act to include a new
subchapter entitled,
"Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution in the
Administrative Process."'* New Section 582 provides explicit statutory authority for voluntary use of ADR in
federal agencies. It also indicates those
situations where such techniques, particularly arbitration, would be inap-
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propriate. The act states that an
agency "shall consider not using" ADR
if;
(1) a definitive or authoritative resolution of
the matter is rt-qiiired for precedential
value, and such a proceeding Is not likely to
be accepted generally as an authoritative
precedent;
(2) the malter involves or may bear upon
significanl questions of government policy
that require additional procedures before a
final resolution may be made, and such a
procufding would not likely serve to develop a recommended policy for the
agency;
(3) maintaining established policies is of
special importance, so that variaticms
among individual decisions are not increased and such a proceeding would not
likely reach consistent results among individual decisions;
(4) the matter significantly affects persons
or organizations who are not parties to the
proceeding;
(5) a full public record of the proceeding is
important, and a dispute resolution proceeding cannot provide such a record; and
(6) the agency must maintain continuing
jurisdiction over the matter with authority
to alter the disposition of the matter in the
light of changed circumstances, and a dispute resolution proceeding would interfere
with the agency's fulfilling that requirement.'"'

Because arbitration procedures
are more formal than other types of
ADR, and since they place decisional
authority in private hands, consideration of these factors plays an especially important role in deciding
whether or not to arbitrate."" Additionally, in Section 5 of the act, a decision to arbitrate or an award which is
clearly inconsistent with the six factors
listed creates a cause of action by an
adversely affected third party to vacate the arbitral award.^-^ For example,
an agency could not legitimately submit a basic policy or budgetary question to an outside arbitrator. Thus, the
act takes into account concerns that
the use of ADR technic]ues in resolving government conflicts will fail tc)
yield "bright line" precedents to inform the public of its policy in future
disputes. Even in the universe of government disputes, however, the cases
where agencies need to articulate
norms, as was required of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Edu-

cation,^'^ are relatively few.
Importantly, the act neither requires use of ADR hy executive agencies nor does it automatically disqual36

ify its use in specific situations,
histead, the act provides for a review
process in which federal agencies will
consider whether and under what circumstances ADR technicjues may help
them fulfill their statutory duties more
effectively.^'* Each agency is required
to designate a senior official to be the
dispute resolution specialist of the
agency. Section 3 of the act makes this
ADR specialist responsible for reviewing disputes and implementing ADR
policies and procedures when applicable.
Besides educating agency personnel regarding ADR and implementing
ADR policies, the act takes various
steps to make it easier for agencies to
utilize currenf ADR expertise. The act
authorizes interagency agreements for
fhe use of "neutrals" whose names
appear on a roster of neufrals main-

"The intent of the
act is to provide
federal agencies
with an 'inexpensive
means of resolving
disputes as an
alternative to
litigation in the
Federal courts'."
tained hy the Administrative Conference.^" Over the past two years, the
Administrative Conference has developed a roster of over 700 neutrals; individuals and organizations whose
experience and activities include mediation, facilitation, arbitration or
other ADR services.^' Moreover, the
act authorizes the Administrative
Conference, in consultation with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, to develop standards for the
selection of neutrals including experience, training, affiliations, and actual
or potential conflicts of interest.~^
At the center of the debate regarding the act's adoption was the use of
arbitration to resolve public sector dis-
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putes.-' New Section 585 authorizes
arbitration under the following conditions;
(a)(]) Arbitrati(m may be used as an alternative means of dispute resolution whenever all parties consent. Consent may be
obtained either before or after an issue in
controversy has arisen. A party may agree
to—
(A) submit only certain issues in
controversy to arbitration; or
(B) arbitration on the condition that
the award must be within <1 range of possible outcomes.
(2) Any arbitration agreement tiiat sets
forth the subject matter submitted to the
arbitrator shall be in writing.
(3) >\ii agency may not require any person to consent to arbitration as a condition
of entering into a contract or obtaining a
benefit.
(b) An officer or employee of an agency
may offer to use arbitration for the resolution of issues in controversy, if such officer
or employee—
(1) has authority to enter into a settlement concerning the matter; or
(2) is otherwise specifically authorized
by the agency to consent to the use of arbi-

The acf only authorizes volunfary
arbitration and specifies that consent
must be in writing.^"" Enforcement of
arbitration agreements is provided for
in Section 586. Section 587 states that
fhe parties to the arbitration are entitled to select the arbitrator. Section.s
588 and 589 provide a structure for
the conduct of the proceedings and
the authority of the arbitrator over the
proceedings. Section 590 discusses arbitration awards.
Section 590(b) also establishes the
right of agency heads to vacate or "opt
out" of an arbitral award within a 30day waiting period before it becomes
final.-" This unusual provision is
grounded in a compromise that wa.s
crucial to the act's passage. The Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department of
Justice raised numerous constitutional
concerns with respect to the use of arbitration (consensual or otherwise) by
the federal governmenf.-' The cieparfment suggested that arhitrators making decisions involving the government would be taking actions as
officers of the U.S., but would not
have heen appointed in the manner
required
by the appointments
clause.^'^ A related worry of the department was that, if fhe arbitrators
were not deemed to be officers of the
U.S., their service in binding arbitra-

tion of governmental disputes might
constitute an impermissible delegation
of either the executive branch's Article
II policy-making responsibility or the
Judiciary's Article HI adjudicative responsibility to private individuals.-'*
Given its concern for the protection of executive prerogatives, the department's position is understandable. Nonetheless, although the
clauses (and even some of the cases)"*"
cited by the department can be construed broadly to require that all government decision-making activity remain in the hands of federal officers,
they need not be read so sweepingly.
Since accountable agency officials will
retain the ultimate right to send (or
not to send) disputes to arbitration,
they will be making tiie critical policy
determination—namely, whether a
matter presents sufficiently important
issues to warrant the use of more formal proceedings. Empowering government officials to decide when to
send an issue to arbitration establishes
an acceptable level of control in tho executive branch—thus satisfying any
appointments clause concerns or concerns about delegation of policymaking responsibilities."^' A variety of
federal statutes already provide specifically for agreements to resolve disputes with the government by use of
private arbitrators, including cases involving government liability or implicating future government action.''^
The Article III argument raised by
the Justice Department concerning the
transferring of judicial power lo private hands is similarly overly formalistic. This position draws on such early
cases as United States v. Anies^-^ in

which the Circuit Court found that the
secretary of war (now called the secretary of defense) exceeded his authority
when he authorized a U.S. attorney to
agree to arbitrate a dispute concerning
damage to government land. Ihe
court held that the use of arbitration
improperly vested judicial power in an
entity that was not an inferior court
created by Congress.'''' Today, administrative agencies routinely decide a
wide range of cases that were, at one
time or another, the province of the
courts/^'' and the Ames position has
been abandoned in the contemporary
"administrative state."•'"^
fn 1985, the Supreme Court in

Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) (left) sponsor of the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act, and autbor Marshall /. Brewer at the Administrative Conference's March 19 ADR
program. Breger cliairs the Administralive Conference.
Tbomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural

Products Co.^^ expressly upheld a requirement of binding arbitration for
certain disputes under the FIFRA
Act.^'^ Under FIF'RA, the arbitrator's
decision is subject to judicial review
only on the issues of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct—a standard
of judicial review similar to that contained in the Federal Arbitration Act.'*''
In rejecting Article Ill-based objections
to the requirement. Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing
for the court majority, observed that
"to hold otherwise would be to erect a
rigid and formalistic restraint on the
ability of Congress to adopt innovative
measures such as negotiation and arbitration with respect to rights created
by a regulatory scheme."'"^
Civen the Justice Department's
concerns, the pending ADR legislation
was stalled in the legislative process
throughout most of 1990.^' At the instigation of congressional committee
chairpersons, a compromise was fashioned in discussions with the American Bar Association, providing a 30day waiting period before an arbitral
award becomes final,'*^ and authorizing an agency head to vacate any
award within this waiting period. Absent extenuating circumstances, a decision to vacate an arbitration award in

the 3n-day period before finality will
require the agency to pay the private
party's expenses and the fees of the
arbitration proceedings."'^
For this arrangement to make
sense, we must assume that the government will rarely use its "opt out"
power. In its testimony before the
Hloiise judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations, the department stated:
"[Wje expect that an agency head
would seldom vacate an award."''' In
indicating his support tor the compromise, then-Assistant Attorney General
William Barr expressed the expectation that agency heads would exercise
this authority to vacate an arbitral
award only in "unusual" cases.'''^
Should this indeed be the case, arbitration may yet become a valuable
ADR device for government agencies.
I would venture to say that any agency
whose head vacates a significant number of awards will find exceedingly
few takers for its subsequent offers to
arbitrate. Thus the "30-day" delayed
finality process raises a number of issues, only some of which are answered by the statute. The success of
the arbitral mechanism, therefore, depends in very large measure on government "good faith."
The act's provision for attorney
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fees in arbitral cases applies only in
cases where the agency head vacates
an arbitral award to which the agency
was a party. Limited attorney fees covering expenses incurred only during
the arbitral phase would be paid if an
award is made bv an arbitrator and
then vacated by the agency head.
Since the act's "opt-out" authority is
unilateral (i.e., only the government
has it), the attorney tee provision was
viewed by several members of Congress as crucial to ensure compensatory balance in the implementation of
the law.
The act specifies a largely automatic fee award process that is simple
and straightforward, it takes advantage of existing agency processes for
handling applications under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA)/" while
avoiding the contentious EAJA question of whether the government's position had "substantial justification.""''
It would compensate ail private parties—not just "small" entities as provided under EAJA^except in those
rare cases where "special circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust."'^ Parties will be compensated
for all reasiinable expenses (as defined
by EAJA) that would not have been
incurred but for the arbitral proceeding. In this regard the Senate report on
its ADR bill (S. 971) noted:
Tho section provides that, in the event
an agency vacates an award or terminates
an arbitration, any party to the arbitration
other than the United States may petition
tor attorney tees and expenses pursuant to
the Equal Acces.s to Justice Act (EAJA). This
petition may be filed with a court or administrative law judge using the standards for
recovery articulated in the KAJA. The section references the EAJA in order to make
use of the complex body of law already developed under that statute and to ensure
that persons usuig ADR procedures have
the same rights as persons who engage in
litigation.
The section also provides that, ii ordered by a court or administrative law
judge, payment for such attorney fees and
expenses must be taken from the tunds of
the agency that vacated the arbitration
award or terminated the arbitration proceedings. The purpose of this provision is
twofold; (1) to reimburse parties who engaged in the arbitration process for their
out-of-pocket expenses, and (2) to provide
an incentive for agencies to abide by an arbitration by making them otherwise liable
for the other parties' costs.''"
Currently
38

under section 504(b)

(l)(A)(ii) (agency adjudicahon) of
HAJA and 28 U.S.C. 2412 (d)(l)(C)(2)
(court cases), attorney fee awards are
limited to $75 an hour plus a higher
amount if the agency by regulation or
the court determines that special factors are present, such as cost of living
increases or a shortage of qualified attorneys. Additionally, courts may authorize higher rates on a case-by-case
basis. If an agency believes tbat it is
necessary to pay higher maximum
rates, the agency must adopt those
rates by rulemaking or administrative
proceedings. To date, no agencies
have done so. The expenses fhat may
be awarded include expert witness
fees and the cosf of studies or tests
necessary for case preparation.
The Administrative Conference
has noted that "most knowledgeable
government officials, contractors and
attorneys agree that government contract appeals have become too onerous, too expensive and too timeconsuming."''" The new ADR Act
provides a basis to reverse this trend.
The act amends the Contract Disputes
Act^' to encourage agency contracting
officers and boards of contract appeals
to use consensual methods to settle acquisition disputes."^^ It specifically authorizes use of ADR, including arbitration, on contract disputes, and calls

for related changes that will greatly
enhance parties' flexibility to resolve
claims via minitriais and other informal means in an area where litigation
has increased almost exponentially in
recent years.
Under the new act, arbitration
and other forms of ADR can be used
either at the contracting officer level or
after a case has been appealed to an
agency board of contract appeals. The
act requires thai the Federal Acquisition Regulation - the body of rules
that govern federal agency acquisition
of goods and services—be amended to
permit agencies to make greater use of
ADR, including arbitration.'-* Additionally, Section 3(d)(l) of the act requires tbat every agency with grant or
contract administrative program functions review its standard contracts or
assistance agreements to determine
whether to amend them to include
language that would authorize and
encourage ADR use. The Administrative Conference is presently developing a recommended model ADR
clause (including arbitration) lor government contracfs.
Tbe new act also serves to encourage settlement by the federal government by amending the Federal Tort
Claims Act^'' to authorize explicitly the
use of ADR. The act permits the attor-

Charles E. Pou jr., attorney for the Administrative Conference and coordinator of its
Roster of Neutrals, fflto with attendees at recent proi^ram for federal af^eiicy ADR
specialists.
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act"). Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat- 2736 (codified in scaltcrcd sections of 9 U.S.C. and 5
U.S.C, and adds 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-95 (1990)).
= Id. at § 2.

Sen. Charles Crasslei/ (R-lozva), another
sponsor of the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act.

ncy general to increase the present,
ceiling on agency sctlJcment authority
to the amount currently delegated to
U.S. attorneys.^'' The Tort Claims Act
had contained a ceiling set decades
ago of $25,000, which required Justice
Department approval of many proposed settlement agreements in small
cases that raise no legal or policy issues. Since agencies often could not
negotiate effectively with private attorneys when they could not "clinch"
a settlement that was over $25,000
without recourse to Justice Department review, the present level served
tu chill settlement discussions. A similar change in the Federal Claims Collection Act'''' permits a raise in agency
authority to settle those cases from the
current $20,000 to $100,000.
The new act means that ADR is
likely to be a significant part of agencies' futures, ready or not. As Court of
Appeals Judge Harry Edwards—one
of the early skeptics about ADR in
public disputes—said when he
chaired a panel discussion at last summer's Judicial Conference, "ADR is
here. How can we make it work?""''
These methods will be an increasingly
important phenomenon in the years to
come. The act represents a mandate,
and an opportunity, lor agency personnel to become educated in these
processes and begin to implement
them. Should they do so, both they
and the public they serve will benefit
immensely.
•
ENDNOTES
' Adnii[-ii.>;tMtivo Dispute RfNclution Act of 19911
(horcinattfr, in bolh footnotes and text, "the

e.g., Braucher, "Arbitrafion Under Government
Contracts," 17 Liiv & Contemporary Problems,
(1952): 473; Greske, "Settlement of War Conh-act
Disputes," 29 Ainerican Bar Association loiirniil
(1943): 13. Only in Executive Order 9017 regard' The Federal Arbitration Act (formorly the
ing tbe powers of the National War Labor Board
United States Arbitration Acf) was first enacted in
was arbitration mentioned as a means of dispute
1925, 43 Stat. 883. tt wa."^ codified in 1947, 61 Stai.
resolution. Execufive Order No. 9t)17, 3 C.F.R.
669 (codified at 9 U.S.C, § 1 ef seq., and amended
1075 (1938-1943) gave the National War Labor
in 1954, 68 Stat, 1233 and in 1971], 84 Stat. 692. See
Board broad authority to "finally determine the
Robert Lawrence Co. v. l\-vonshire Fabrics, Inc.. 271dispule, and for this purpose . . . use mediation,
F.2d 402 {CA2 NY 1959), cert, granted, 362 U.S.
voluntary arbitration, or arbitrafion under rules
909 (1960), cerl. dismisfeii pursuant to ulipulation. established hy the Board." See Teller. "The War
364 U.S. 801 (1960).
Labor Board and Management Functions," 21
New York University Law Review (1946); 319; SymOne of Ihe dark chapters in lej;al histor}'
posium, "An Oral Historj' oi the Nafional War
concerns the validity, interpretation and
Labor Board and Critical Issues in tbe Developenforceability of arbitration agreements.
ment of Modern Grievance Arbitration." 39 Case
i*rom the standpoint of businessmen
Western Reserve (1989): 505.
generally and of those immediately affected by such agreements they were
^ 1 have found only one example of an agency
beneficial and salutary in every way. But
effort to arbitrate contract disputes without exto the conrts and to the judges they were
plicit statutor\' authorization. An appeals board
anathema. . . . Suffice it to say for a
laler found fhat the Department of Interior had
considerable time prior to the passage of
arbitrated without statutory authority, frames and
the Arbitration Act in 1925 the Congress
Moore, Inc., IBCA No. 1308"-IO-79, 81-2BCA76.
had come to the conclusion that an effort
393 (Oct, 27. 1981), The Adminisb-ative Confershould be made to legislate on the subence of Ihe United States, see 1 C.F,R. §305,86-3.
ject of arbitration in such fashion as io
(1990) reprinted in Sourceiiook, supra note 4 at 113,
remove the hostility of the judiciary and
and many others have recommended a more exmake the benefits of arbitration generpansive use of arbitration by administrative agenally available to the business world,
cies. See Hardy & Cargill, sitprn note 4, at 351,
3.S3; Berg, supra note 4 (argues that G.A.O.'s obhi. al 4llfS- 7, For a discussion of common law and
jections are without legal foundation).
statutory arbitration of private rights, see generally M. Domke, Ccmimereia! Arbitration (Deerfield, '•7 U.S.C. §^ I36-I36y (1988).
II: Callaghan & Co., revised ed, 1984).
'42U.S,C, §9612(b)(4)(l988);4C)C,F,R. §30^.10^ For example, 5 Comp. Gen. 417 (1925); 8 Comp,
52.
Cen. 96 (1928). The General Accounting Office
« 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988);29C.F,R. §2641,1-.13.
based its posifion on (1) an expansive reading of
31 U,S,C, § 1346 (1988) (formerly §§ 672, 673)
''Executive Order No, 11,491, Labor-Managewhich prohibits the use of federal funds to pay
ment Relafions in the Federal Service, § 14 Arbi"(A) the pay or expenses of a commission, countrafion of Grievances, 34 Fed. Reg, 17605 (Oct, 21,
cil, board, or similar group, or a member of that
1969). Motably. in this context, the General Acj;roup; |or] (B) expenses related to the work or
counfing Office has consistenfiy recognized the
results of work or action of that group" unless
resulting arbitral awards as valid. See, for examauthorized by a specific statute; and (2) 31 U.S.C.
ple, 54 Comp, Gen, 312 (1974),
^ 3702 (1988) which states that "fhe Comptroller
'"5 U,S,C, §719(1988); 39 U,S,C, ii 1207(1988),
General shall settle all claims of or against the
United States Government," See also 31 U,S.C,
" I'uh. L, No, 101-552, g 2(7) states: "Federal
§ 3526 (1988) (Comptroller General's jurisdiction
agencies may not only receive [he benefit of techover settlement of federal accounts).
niques Ihat were developed in the private sector,
The Comptroller General has argued that the
but may also take the lead in the further developexistence of statutes providing explicit authority
ment and refinement of such technit|ues,"
to arbitrate dispute.s indicates a contrary intent
'- rut>. L, No, 101-552, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 2736-37
when a statute is silent. For example, 32 Comp,
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 581). Administrafive proGen. 333, 335 (1953), For a detailed analysis and
gram: "includes a Federal function whicb inhistory of the Comptroller General's position, see
Berg, Les-fl/ and Structural Obslacles to the Use of volves protection of the public interest and tbe
Alternatiui' Dis^pute Resolution for Claims for and determination of rights, privileges, and obligations of private persons through rule making, adAgainst Ibe federal Government, Administrative
Conference of the U.S,, Studies in Administrative judicafion, licensing, or investigation, a.s those
Law ami Procedure 88-1, 43-73; Hardy & Cargill, terms are used in subchapter II of this chapter;"
Id. § 4(b), § 581. (Definitions), 104 St.it. at 2738.
"Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why
Not Arbitrate," 34 federal Par iournai {1975): 1, 1 f • "Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 3(b). (c) and (d). 104
14, reprinted in Administrative Conference of the
Stat. at 2737.
U,S,, Sourcebook: Federai Agency Use of Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution (Office of the Chair- '•• Pub, L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. a[ 2738
man, 1987) (hereinafter, Sourcebook) at 361-364; (codified at 5 U,S.C. § 58^-593),
Behre, "Arbitration: A Permissible or Desirable
'•^ Pub. L, No, 101-552. § 4(h). lt)4 Stat. at 2739
Method for Resolving Disputes Involving Federal
(codified at 5 U.S,C., § .S82(b)).
Acquisition and Assistance Contracts?," 16 Contract t.aw journal (1986): 66, 74-79, reprinted in
'"S. Rep. No. 543. 101st Cong., 2nd Sess, 10,
Sourtebook ai 382-387; Harter, Points on a Contin- reprinted in United States Code Con;^ressional and
uum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Adminis-Administrative News (1990): 3931, 3940.
trative Process (report to the Administrative Con- '•'• Pub. L.No. 101-552. §5. 104 Stat. at 2745 (codiference, June 5, 1986), reprinted in Soureebook, fied, as amended, ai 9 U.S.C, § 10) regarding ju309, 321-325.
dicial review ot arbitration awards provides:
In 1921 the Bureau of Ihe Budget considered
but rejected use of arbitration in contract appeals.
(b) fbe United States district court for
During World War II, arbitration was again conthe district wherein an award was made
sidered: several pieces of legislation were introthat was issued pursuant to section 590
duced to permit arbitrafion but did not pass. See.
of title 5 may make an order vacating the

JUNE 1991, ARBITRATION JOURNAL

39

award upon Hie Jpplication iit a purson,
other than a party lu thf arbitration,
who is adversely affected or aggrieved
by the award, if the use of arbitration or
the award is dearly inconsistent with the
factors set forth in section 582 of fitli' n.
The standard to be utilized by the courl to determine that arbitration or the award is "clearly inconsistent with the factors" is ver\' vague. However, since Section 582 doe.sn't prohibit usi? of
A[>K in the presence of any of iKe factors, but
only provides for agency consideration of factors
militatinf; against using ADR, creating a third
party right of review mifihl result in j;re<Tler
agency caution wben choosing arbitration to resolve disputes,
'M49 U.S. 294 (1955).
'" Pub. I.. Mo. im-552, § 4|b), U)4 Stal. at 273'5
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 582(c)) ("Alternative means
of dispute resolution authorized under this subchapter are voluntary procedures which supplement rather than limit other available agency dispute resolution techniques.").
^" Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4(b), 104 Stat. at 2739
(codified at 5 U.S.C, § 583).
" ."i U.S.C at§583(c)(2), 1 C.F.K. Part 31C> (1991).
•• 5 U.S.C. at § .'i83(c)(l). Regarding conflicts ol"
interest, § 583(a) states: "A neutral shall have no
official, financial, or personal conflict ot interest
with respect to tbe issues in controversy, unless
such interest is fully disclosed in writing to all
parties and all parties agree that the neutral mav
serve,"
-^Pub, L, No, 101-552, §4(b) and § 5 , Itl4Stat. at
2742-45 (codified at 5 U,S.C. §§ 585 591) and SJ
U,S,C. 6 10), Unlike other ADR techniques mentioned in the Act, arbitration is discu.ssed in considerable detail. In part, this is to emphasize the
concurrent authorit}' of the Federal Arbitration
Act over any public sector arbitration. See S, Rep.
No, 543, Supra note 16 at 3942, regarding Pub. I..
No, 1(11 -552, §4(h), 104 Stat. at 2742 (codified at 3
U,S.C. § 586) (enforcement ot" arbitration agreements),
'-^5 U.S,C, at §585.
^•^ 5 U.S.C, at ^ 585(a)(2).
states thai an agency may
ing if the parties consent,
ment that sueb consent be

In contrast,
use an ADR
without any
reduced to a

^ 582(a)
proceedrequirewriting,

-^5 U.S.C, at g 590(c), Section 590(e) provides
that a vacated arbitration award is not admissible
in a later proceeding on the issues m controversy,
^^ For example, The Adini}ii^trathv Dispute Resolution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Lazv and Governmental Relations oj Ihe !lou:^e
Comm. on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 2 47 (1990) (Testimony of Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); The Adniinistralwe Dispute
Resolution Act of 1989: Hearing'^ Before tlw Sukouitn.
on Oversight of Cavernmctit Maiiai^etncnt ol the Senate Comyn. on Govfrninenta! Affairs. lOIst Cong.,
1st Sess., 86, 93-102 ("1989) (Prepared statement
of Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
28 U.S. Const, art. II, ^ 2, cl. 2. ("Officers of tbe
United States" shall be appointed by the President, Ihe courts or the "Heads of Departments.")
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Federal
Election Commissioners could noi he appointed
by Congress),
^* !d. art, II, § 3 (President's responsibility to take
care that the laws he faithf\illy executed); id. art.
Ill §§ 1-2 (vesting judicial power over cases and
controversies arising under the constitution),
^ See, for example, Ruckley sufirii note 28,
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" BrutI, "Tbe Conslilutionality of Arbitration in
i-ederal Programs," Aiiministralive Conference of
Ihe United States: Recomntcndtitions imd Reports,
Vol. I, 553 (I9H7). See also "A Colloquium on
Improving Dispute [Resolution; Options for the
i-ederal Government," 1 Aihniiustrativc iiur jour
nal (1987): .399 (includes remarks of Harold Briitl
on ihis point using examples Irom various statutes thai permit arbitration ol disputes); see also
t-upra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
« See, for example, 22 U.S.C. g 2398 (19K8) (investment guaranties under foreign assistance
programs); 46 U,S.C. 6 749 (1988) (Suits in Admiralty Act); 4(1 U,S.C, § 7Hfi (1988) (arbitraHon,
ciimpromise or sfttlemenl under the Public Vessel.s Acl); 5 U,S.C, g 1 l(}l(c)(5)(l')88) (binding arbitration ot employee grievances under collective
bargaining agreements pursuant to the Civil Service kctorm Act oi^ 1978), For a discussiiin of statules which include arbitration provisions, see
generaliy Harter, "Dispute Resolution and .Administrative l a w : The History, Needs, and Future of A Complex Relationship," 29 Villanoi'a
Uiw Review (1983-4): 1393, reprinted in Sourcebwk
nt 119,
" 24 F, Cas, 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). See Hardv
and Cargill, suprii note 4, at 360-M. ("Instead ol
being used as a bar to arbitration by the Government today, Anirs should more properly be
viewed as an example of the general nineteenth
century judicial attitude distavoring arbitration,
even by private parties.")
" Ames, 24 F, Cas, at 789.
*' See Pierce, "Morrison v. Olson: Separation oi
Powers and the Structure of tbe Government,"
Supreme Court Rez'iew {19SH): I, 15

was one ot the tiases upon wbicb the lower couTt
struck down the Medicare scheme McClure v,
Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 414, 415-17 (N.D. Cal.
1980), rev'd Suh nom. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
••- Pub. L, No. nil-552, §590(b), 104 Stat, at 2743.
The compromise, codified at 5 U.S.C. ^ 590(b),
provides:
(b) "I'be award in an arbitration proceeding shall become final 3(1 days after it is
served on ail parties. Any agency that is
a party to the proceeding may extend
this 30-day period for an additional 30day period by serving a notice of such
extension on all olber parties before the
end ol the first 30-day period.
^' Pub. L. No. IOl-552§59O(g), 104 Stat. at 2744
(codified at 5 U S.C. § 590(g)).
*' See teiitimony, supra note 27, at 47.
•••' See testimony, supra note 27, at 48,
•"•5 U.S.C. ^ 5t]4(I990).
^' Id. § 504(a)(l).
^^ Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4|b), 104 Stat. at 2744
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 590(g)).
' " S , Rep, No. 543, lOIsl Cong., 2nd Sess, 14-15,
reprinted in United States Code of Congressuma! &
Administrative News (1990): 3931," 3943-3944.
"" Administrative Conference ot the United States
Recommendation 87-11: "Alternatives for Resolving Government Contract Disputes," reprinted in Adminislralive Conference of the United
Slates Reamvricndalions and Rei'ortf, Vol. 1, ftO
(1987). 1 C.F.R. § 305,86-1
•I .11 U,S,C, §§604-607(1990).

'" In United States v, l-arragut. S9 LLS, (22 Wall.)
406 (1874), the Court upheld arbitration vvbere
the lower court agreed to refer a pending --uil lo
arbitrators whose decision would beconir the
judgmenf of the Court.
The plan of Article 111 courts in the adjudicative landscape is brilliantly canvassed in Bator,
"The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative
and Administrative Courts Under Article III," Ii5
Indiana Liw lournal (19911): 2.33. See also Fallon,
"Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III," 101 Harvard hiw Revieic (1988):
915.

~^~ Pub. I , No. I01-552,§6, 104 Stat. at 2745 (codified al 41 US.C. §606).
" Pub. L. No. Ull -552, § 3(d), 104 Stat. at 2745
(codified at 41 U.S.C, 405(a)),

'"Thomas v. Union Carbide AgricLillural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)

'^' Edwards, "Alternate Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?," 99 Harvard Lm< Rcvniv (1986):
668,

'« 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
'" See 9 U.S.C. %% \-\5{\9iif,y, Thomas, 473 U.S. at
60], In his concurring opinion. Justice Brenn.m
noted that judicial review under FIFKA encompasses the authority of courls fo invalidate an arbitrator's decision when it exceeds the arbitrator's
authority or exhibits manifest disregard for governing law,
-"' Thomas, 473 U,S. at 593- 594. Allhough ihe constitufional propriety of using private artiitralors
in the judicial branch was not discussed in the
opinion, the Court was fully briefed on this issue
by Ihe parties.
•" Besides the Article II and Article 111 concerns,
an additional claim was thai binding arbitration
would violate tbe requirements of due process.
ITowever, in Schrvciker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188
(1982), the Supreme Court has upheld tbe use of
outside decision-makers for part of the Medicare
program (in wbicb private insurance carriers receive and decide claims for reimbursement under
the Medicare program ihat arc ultimately horne
by the Federal Governmenf), in tace of a direct
due process challenge. Apart from the potential
due process problems presented, tbe CouTt
showed no concern over the confeTral ot arbitral
autbority on private parlies—even though thai
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'-• Pub, L, No, 101-552, ^ 8, 104 Sfat, af 2745 (codified at 28 U S , C , 2672).
'" The level was recently raised to $500,000. 56
Fed. Reg. 8523, 8924 (March 4, 1991), implemented by 5fi Fed. Reg. 12666 (March 27, 1991),
'••" Pub. L, No, 101-552, S«. 104 Stat. at2745 (codified at 31 U,S,C, 371](a)(2)).
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